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Abstrak:
Salah satu reaksi terhadap globalisasi adalah menguatnya identitas-identitas 
lokal yang beranak pinak menjadi gerakan separatisme, fanatisme agama, dan 
gerakan primordialisme. Konflik-konflik yang bermunculan di penghujung abad 
20 ditandai dengan konflik identitas dan kepentingan. Karena itu perhatian 
dan studi tentang identitas menjadi begitu penting untuk kepentingan proses 
perdamaian. Sumbangan dari dunia akademis ini sangat dinantikan oleh para 
 peace maker mengingat makin massif dan banyaknya konflik antar negara, 
golongan, maupun agama yang terjadi. Dalam proses perdamaian di Irlandia 
Utara terlihat bagaimana peran identitas itu begitu kental. Tulisan ini mencoba 
membedah problem perdamaian di Irlandia Utara itu dari kacamata  identity 
theory. Dengan pemahaman yang lebih baik atas masing-masing kubu yang 
bertikai, tulisan ini memberikan rekomendasi bahwa proses perdamaian yang 
selama ini telah ditempuh perlu dirombak ulang. Proses ini kiranya relevan 
bagi Indonesia
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1. Introduction
Identity is a term used in many academic disciplines especially in relations 
to individual human beings. This essay, however, will try to explore the role of 
 identity within international relations with special reference to the  peace process 
in Northern Ireland. To do so it is necessary to first look more generally at 
some different schools within international relations and their understanding 
of  identity. In this essay I will examine the role of  identity in those schools.
In a second step will I try to apply some of the theory about  identity to 
the developments of the  peace process in Northern Ireland, looking first at 
the involvement of the states of Ireland, Britain and the USA before looking 
closer at the different communities in Northern Ireland and the influence 
of the  peace process to their identities. In the end, I will give a hint to the 
Indonesian cases.
144 — ORIENTASI BARU, VOL. 18 NO. 2, OKTOBER 2009
2. Identity in International Relations
Within International Relations there are numerous different definitions of 
 identity. The major difference appears to be about the origin of  identity; where 
it comes from, and who or what “makes” it. It is possible to distinguish two 
different approaches to this question:  identity as either fixed or constructed. 
As we will see, answering the question with one or the other will lead to 
completely different accounts of the centrality of  identity in international 
relations. A second distinction can be made about the role of interests in the 
context of  identity and the overall implications of  identity for the concept of 
 security.
2.1 Identity: Fixed or Constructed?
In the  Realist tradition  identity is usually seen as a fixed entity unable to 
change under any circumstances. Morgenthau defines human beings as egoistic 
by nature – a feature that forms the structure of behaviour and is reflected 
by the selfish behaviour of states in the international order.1 If this is true, 
 identity is almost a biological matter, unchangeable and deeply rooted within 
humans, as if determined by their genetic code. 
Some assumptions about the underlying concept of  identity for the Neo-
 Realist Kenneth Waltz can be revealed by looking closely at his theory: Conflict 
at any level, ranging from the individual to the international, is seen as 
unavoidable if not constrained by government. For Waltz since it is impossible 
for there to be a global government, the system of anarchy will always rule 
the international order and states have to engage in a self-help system; any 
attempt to escape the system will be punished by it.2 
What does this imply for the concept of  identity? If states cannot act 
in any other way than the system is allowing them, there is no space for a 
change of  identity at all. Actually, if everyone behaves according to the same 
pattern,  identity becomes even unnecessary since no distinction between actors 
is possible. Indeed, Alexander Wendt observes similarly that in a realist concept 
co-operative behaviour in the anarchic self-help system is strategic and only 
implies a change of behaviour but never a change of  identity.3
Wendt as a Social Constructivist defines  identity as “relatively stable, 
role specific understandings and expectations about self.”4 ’Relatively’ already 
implies that here  identity is not fixed. Identity is shaped on a relational basis; 
it is interaction that makes actors form concepts of self and other. The same is 
true for institutions which are formed cognitively by the actors.5 There is no 
 identity before and independent of action.6 How much this  identity formation 
relies on cognitive acts becomes clear when Wendt speaks of how “actors 
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can engage in self-reflection and practice specifically designed to transform 
their identities and interests.”7 Against the  Realist concept, therefore, Wendt 
defines state behaviour not as formed by structure but by practices; changing 
the actions would imply a change of  identity.8 A “mirror theory of  identity-
formation” forms a state’s  identity as a reflection of another state’s practice.9
Both accounts given on  identity so far concentrate more or less strongly on 
interstate behaviour; however, it seems difficult to apply them in a satisfactory 
way to ethnic conflicts that frequently happen within states. This observation 
has led to a reconsideration of the traditional understanding of  security by the 
so-called Copenhagen School: “This was a theoretical challenge, because these 
issues were not simply absent in the sense that classical  security studies did 
not care; they were radically absent because they could not be represented in 
the classical state-centric theory”10.
Though coming from a realist tradition and still seeing state  security as a 
major issue they eventually developed an approach called “Societal Security.”11 
A dual  security system is established being fundamentally about survival: of 
the state and of society. For the state sovereignty becomes the central feature, 
 identity is seen as central for the survival of society: “if this happens, we will 
no longer be able to live as ’us’.”12 They perceive  identity as neither fixed nor 
constructed and yet both. 
They seem to make a distinction between different levels of  identity: 
though they acknowledge that a society consists of numerous sub-groups - 
each equipped with a distinct  identity - the only one they understand to be 
stable is societal  identity: “societal  security concerns the ability of a society 
to persist in its essential character under changing conditions and possible or 
actual threats.”13 If ’essential character’ is here used as a synonym for  identity, 
it implies a fixed or at least a stable understanding. Indeed, they mention that 
their focus is on “established” identities. Though they see  identity as socially 
constructed in its origin, they feel the need to observe  identity as a “thing” 
or a “product”, finally “sedimented” in society so that it can be studied in 
their terms.14 
Of central importance for the construction of  identity for McSweeney is the 
recursive relationship between agency and structure called “social practice”: it 
is regular behaviour in order to make action meaningful that connects agency 
and structure.15 Routine can be seen as a synonym for structure; it allows for 
social action but at the same time it is formed by action through those who 
act.16 Identity, therefore, is a combination of human choice but at the same 
time that choice is restricted by routine. 
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This understanding of  identity is different from the  Realist position shown 
above. In the sense that there is a choice in the formation of  identity and no 
external structure that determines it;  identity is constructed. But at the same 
time it is different from Wendt’s purely cognitive approach, since the choice 
of  identity is constrained by a structure of routine.17 
In the  Realist fixed understanding the subordination of structure over 
 identity leaves no space for development or change within international 
relations. Besides, its focus on the state seems incomplete. Wendt’s approach on 
the other hand leaves space for development and learning in the international 
arena; he, however, focuses very much on the state again and neglects collective 
and individual  identity. The Copenhagen School tries to address this weakness 
by focusing only on societal  identity but stays at a superficial level.
Wendt’s and McSweeney’s approaches provide answers to the origins of 
structure and leave at the time space for development. McSweeney’s concept 
of a recursive relationship between agency and routine as basis for  identity 
pays attention to structure but can also explain its origin in human agency and 
habit. This approach makes more sense than some sort of structure completely 
independent from humans.
2.2 Identity and Interests. A Matter of Security?
All the approaches shown above that see  identity as constructed recognise 
the difficulties such a change has to face.18 Seeing  identity as constructed does 
not yet explain how a change of  identity can be brought about. In this section 
the focus will be to analyse the problem of change and its relation to interests. 
Eventually the focus will be on how this can be related to  security. 
The states in Waltz’s self-help system only follow their own interests; co-
operation is only a temporary strategic occurrence, a behaviour encouraged 
by the structure of anarchy under certain circumstances and best described as 
balance of power.19 International relations are consequently driven by interests 
alone, not by  identity.
Wendt on the other hand, perceives interests as inferior to  identity; it is 
 identity that forms interests and not the other way round. Interests are formed 
according to  identity roles and the expectations that go along with them.20 
Although they are dependent on actors in the sense that they are constructed 
by their cognitive  identity formation, Wendt acknowledges that institutions 
are experienced as real and superior to individuals, experienced as “coercive 
social fact.”21 In them he locates the resistance to a change of  identity: It 
is coercive in the sense that it encourages some behaviour as opposed to 
others.22 This consequently means that Wendt does not deny Waltz’s system 
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of anarchy and self-help; it may be socially constructed but once established, 
it is very persuasive and real. Also the desire to maintain a stable  identity, 
considerations about the costs of breaking established commitments, and 
opposition to challenges that can be perceived as threats to the  identity are 
identified as factors making change of  identity difficult. 
This approach is interesting since it takes into account that on the 
international stage self-help is a common occurrence; but at the same time 
it does not accept it as given and unchangeable, but tries to explore the 
mechanisms that facilitate it. Revealing those mechanisms could provide a 
powerful instrument to change the ways of the world. 
The Wendt’s theory intend to overcome the obstacles to  identity formation, 
that is : “new ideas about self and other must transcend [these obstacles].”23 
This implies a strong element of choice and cognition but does not really 
explain why actors should take the effort to transcend obstacles at all.
McSweeney is very suspicious of Wendt’s purely cognitive approach for 
exactly the same reason: what makes actors change their  identity? Both, Wendt 
and McSweeney agree that material forces alone are of little value on their 
own; rather that it is actors who give them meaning or no meaning at all: “if 
the United States and Soviet Union decide that they are no longer enemies, 
’the cold war is over’”24 “If Spaniards stop believing in the conflict with ETA, 
westerners in the conflict with the Soviet Union, and British with the IRA, 
these conflicts are over.”25 But for McSweeney interests also play a vital role 
in the formation and change of  identity: 
It is idealistic to imagine that individuals or collectives, socialized by habit and 
history into a particular sense of self, will choose to change without the incentive 
or pressure of self-interest.26
“Choose to change” implies a constructivist approach like Wendt’s, but 
at the same time the term “self-interest” implies that choice is not the only 
component in  identity formation. As has been the case with agency and 
structure, he also sees  identity and interests as recursive. Not only does 
 identity form interests but interests can also influence who one wants to be.27 
McSweeney’s position combines and rejects at the same time both realism 
with its focus on material interests as well as a purely cognitive approach 
like Wendt’s.28
In order to understand the connections between  identity, interests, and 
 security fully, it is at this point necessary to look at the underlying concepts 
of  security. For the Realists,  security is a matter of survival on the interstate 
level,  identity is of no importance since the structure makes states only act 
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according to their interests, namely self-interests. This understanding of  security 
is very one-dimensional since it rules out any possibility of change from the 
beginning through the establishment of a fixed structure and since it simplifies 
 security problems on national levels leaving it to the state to deal with it.
Wendt also focuses on state  security and shows no interest in sub-state 
 security. Nonetheless his approach could offer possibilities for the establishment 
of a  security policy: States can learn to change their identities if they choose 
to do so from self-help to co-operation.
The focus of the Copenhagen School on societal  identity tries to shift the 
focus away from the state in their concept of societal  security, but they do 
not progress beyond this point. Establishing  identity as a matter for society 
neglects deeper layers of  identity like sub-societal groups as can be found in 
Northern Ireland.
McSweeny on the other hand, offers an approach to  security that does not 
follow hierarchic structures but is rather a bottom up theory which focuses on 
the individual as the referent of  security. A positive understanding focused on 
human needs as opposed to an understanding focused purely on survival is to 
be established.29 Individuals are seen as the agents that form collective, societal 
and state  identity and behaviour.30 This approach also leaves more possibilities 
for  security policy since survival is not the only interest at its heart. 
Establishing  identity and interests in a recursive relationship implies more 
than just combining cognitive and material elements. It implies that identities 
can be influenced from the outside by influencing interests. McSweeney 
uses even stronger terms: he speaks of management, manipulation and even 
seduction. These terms should not be understood in the negative sense in 
which they are usually perceived; rather they should be seen as a chance for 
 security or even a  peace process.31
This thesis seems very challenging, especially with reference to ethnic 
conflicts that are usually perceived as being primarily about  identity. Can 
approaching material interests really alter these strong divisions? Furthermore, 
can interests be especially managed and manipulated in order to achieve  peace, 
and by whom?
3. The Peace Process in Northern Ireland
The signing of the Good Friday Agreement in Belfast in April 1998 came 
as a surprise to many who had seen the conflicting identities in Northern 
Ireland as irreconcilable. 
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For a long time,  peace did not seem possible in Northern Ireland; the two 
communities found themselves in fierce opposition, none of them willing to 
move an inch towards the other. Compromise was not a term usually used 
by Unionists or Nationalists: “No first step because it is a step towards Irish 
unity (the Unionist position); no first step unless it is a step towards Irish 
unity (the Nationalist position).”32 What Aughey rightly called a “zero-sum 
game”33 seems to fit in perfectly with a realist concept (though not at state 
level): the actors were only concerned with relative gains, non willing to see 
the wider picture. 
How then, was such a drastic change possible? Aughey speaks of “…
conditions [that] existed” and of a “dream dreamed”34 that made it happen. 
But was it really a “victory of people over structures, an expression of the 
democratic will to redefine the collective identities which had endured over 
centuries to generate the violence of Northern Ireland?”35
This section will look closer at the ’conditions’ and what constituted 
them and if really a dream was dreamt in Northern Ireland or if the events 
there were not driven by what McSweeney called a “seduction model of 
integration?”36 
In a first step this section will investigate the role of Ireland, Britain 
and the USA in the  peace process. The second step will look closely at the 
Nationalist and Unionist traditions in Northern Ireland, trying to discover the 
impact of the  peace process on their identities.
3.1 Manipulation of Interests: The Role of the Ireland, Britain and the US
The Irish constitution had held in the articles 2 and 3 the claim of the 
territorial unity of the island of Ireland including Northern Ireland. This claim 
showed Ireland’s firm ideological support for unity with Northern Ireland (at 
least on paper), was of central importance for the Nationalist movement in the 
North and formed the basis for the armed struggle of the IRA. Nonetheless 
the majority of the population of the Republic of Ireland and the majority 
of the Nationalist community in the North voted in favour of an agreement 
that would change the territorial claim of the constitution into a birthright 
for inhabitants of Northern Ireland to have Irish nationality. What made the 
Republic of Ireland change its constitution in such an important matter? 
Besides the fact that maybe the attachment of the Republic to Northern 
Ireland was never as strong as Nationalists wanted to believe, a major turning 
point in the attitude of the Republic over Northern Ireland can be associated 
with the establishment of the so-called New Ireland Forum in 1983; its purpose 
was to re-examine what Nationalism meant for Ireland at the end of the 20th 
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century, to explicitly re-define Nationalism and its impact on Unionism in 
favour of a more pluralist attitude.37 
The mere existence of such an attempt appears to be a proof of Wendt’s 
cognitive  identity theory; certainly the people of Ireland wanted to change 
their  identity but still, this attempt cannot be seen as detached from certain 
developments in the Republic of Ireland. Firstly, the on-going secularisation 
that transformed and still transforms Irish  identity certainly made it easier 
to open towards the Unionist  identity. Furthermore, the conflict between 
Thatcher’s Conservative government and the IRA had reached a very violent 
and critical phase; Thatcher’s unwillingness to compromise during hunger 
strikes for example had ensured Sinn Fein’s electoral success: a trend that the 
Irish government wanted to oppose.38 
Not only did the Forum redefine the Nationalist  identity; it also came up 
with possible solutions for the future of Northern Ireland that already reached 
far beyond the traditional constitutional claims of article 2 and 3: “a unitary 
Irish state, a federal or confederal state and joint authority.”39 Although these 
solutions were rejected by the British government London nonetheless signed 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement shortly after in 1985, which included a consultative 
role for the Dublin government, acknowledging that the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland were no longer an internal matter but “were the business of both 
Dublin and London.”40 
Mrs Thatcher, who was traditionally seen as a defender of the Union, 
make such a concession that gave Ireland such an important role in the 
decision making of the future of Northern Ireland. One reason was certainly 
an unexpected involvement of the Reagan administration in favour of the 
Agreement. Although the United States had at some points during the 
Troubles criticised the British government for its role in Northern Ireland, 
the involvement of the US government in the conflict in Northern Ireland 
was traditionally very low. But from the mid 1970s the Irish government 
-especially through the influence of SDLP leader John Hume- had tried to 
influence Irish-American congress members to support a peaceful settlement 
for Northern Ireland as opposed to those Irish-Americans who funded the 
IRA.41 The US involvement for the Anglo-Irish Agreement shows the success 
of such an attempt. 
The Irish government, however, cannot be seen as the sole winner of the 
Agreement. It had to pay for its consultative role with the acceptance of the 
principle of consent that “any change in the status of Northern Ireland would 
only come about with the consent of a majority of the people of Northern 
Ireland.”42 
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Concerning the role of the British government- other, more material factors 
must also be taken into consideration. Since the partition in 1922 Northern 
Ireland was part of the United Kingdom and the Protestant majority of the 
North closely associated and still associates with the Union. Northern Ireland 
had once been of some importance in economic and strategic terms for the 
United Kingdom, especially during the two World Wars, however this changed 
drastically. By the beginning of the 1990s  security expenditure and the highest 
unemployment rate of the UK43 turned Northern Ireland into an extremely 
costly province.44 The statement of the Secretary of State Peter Brooke later 
mirrored by the British government in the so-called Downing Street Declaration: 
“that they have no selfish strategic or economic interest in Northern Ireland”45 
does not show the same kind of attachment from the British governments 
towards the Northern Irish Unionists, especially since public support for the 
Union with Northern Ireland on the British mainland diminished strongly.46 
Even stronger, McSweeney states that Britain certainly had a selfish interest in 
Northern Ireland which was to get rid of it and that many aspects of British 
behaviour were not actually neutral to the future status of Northern Ireland 
but rather encouraging devolution.47 This trend could already be observed in 
the signing of the Ireland Act in 1949 which already stated the principle of 
consent.48 The secret talks in which the British government were involved with 
Sinn Fein from 1989 onwards can also be seen in this light. 
Again, American influence was a key element for the negotiations between 
the Conservative party, (now under John Major) and the Nationalists and the 
subsequent signing of the Downing Street Declaration by the British and Irish 
governments in 1993, especially since the Conservatives depended more and 
more on Unionist votes.49
The involvement of the White House into Northern Irish affairs had reached 
a completely different scale after the election of President Clinton. It is not 
completely clear what the reason for Clinton’s commitment were, but amongst 
his dislike for John Major and pressure from influential Irish-Americans, one 
major reason contributing to that development was certainly the end of the 
cold war. The ’special relationship’ that had linked the US and Britain during 
the cold war suddenly was not that important any more. The US could afford 
to offend its ally to a certain extent and it did, by not considering the affairs 
in Northern Ireland as a purely British matter anymore.50 The end of the 
cold war also left US foreign policy somewhat disorientated at the beginning 
of the Clinton era and Northern Ireland might have provided a manageable, 
reasonably inexpensive opportunity with some prospects of success to give it 
a new profile and maybe even attract voters in the US.51 It seems of  identity 
formation through interests. 
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That is why the Clinton administration involved in Northern Ireland? One 
example was to strongly encourage Sinn Fein and especially Gerry Adams to 
convince the IRA to engage in the  peace process. The highly controversial visas 
to the USA granted to Gerry Adams during the St. Patrick’s days of 1994 and 
1995 were not primarily intended to annoy John Major and the Unionists: rather 
they were intended to improve Adam’s influence within the IRA. The flattering 
admission to the White House was also part of a bargain; admission had to be 
seen in exchange for a stronger commitment of Sinn Fein to accept the Downing 
Street Declaration.52 Although the commitment of the US government was much 
in favour of the Nationalist tradition, it was said to have no hidden agenda 
by being involved in Northern Ireland and soon tried to appear very balanced 
in its attention to both sides of the divide, realising that this was necessary to 
achieve anything.53 The election of the Labour party in Britain in 1997 helped 
the  peace process further. They did not depend on Unionist votes and came 
along to “modernise Britain”, furthermore the relationship between Clinton and 
Blair was on much better terms; Blair actually welcomed and encouraged the 
US involvement in the  peace process, a move that strengthened the influence 
of the Clinton Administration.54
Economic aspects also played a vital role in convincing the conflicting 
parties to go along with the  peace process. The US encouraged companies 
to invest in Northern Ireland and even set up Investment Conferences for 
Northern Ireland in 1995 and 1996.55 ’No secret agenda’ was maybe not as 
true as the White House wanted the Unionists to believe: “In the Clinton 
catechism,  peace, stability and prosperity are very much linked.”56 Certainly 
the US economy profits from a stable Northern Ireland as one of its gates into 
the European market but this does not diminish the fact that the consequences 
of these investments were certainly felt in Northern Ireland by Nationalists 
and Unionists alike. Financial support had also been part of the strategy of 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement and had successfully employed the help of the US, 
Canada, New Zealand which deliberately influenced the  peace process with 
generous financial support for the Northern Irish economy.57 Further examples 
are the support of the EU into reconciliation projects announced after the first 
IRA ceasefire in 1994 and the promise of huge financial support by Britain 
coinciding with the advent of the referendum about the Belfast Agreement in 
1998.58
So what was/is the driving force behind the Northern Irish  peace process? 
From what has been observed so far, certain assumptions about the nature of 
the process can be made. Firstly, apparently support for the  peace process, 
best visible in the outcome of the referendum in 1998, did not solely reflect a 
collective decision by the people of Northern Ireland to overcome old divisions 
and identities in favour of a new shared  identity. Many external factors 
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seemed to contribute to the outcome, including governmental and economic 
decisions to influence the  peace process in a certain direction. Secondly, these 
external factors cannot be seen as arbitrary but as deliberately employed by 
Ireland, Britain and the US to come to a settlement in Northern Ireland. These 
strategies again, cannot be seen as independent  moral decisions either, as has 
been shown above, but have to be put in context with concrete more or less 
selfish interests of each of the three states involved. 
The process shown above so far certainly meets with McSweeney’s 
description of the seduction model of integration: “Seduction hints at 
conspiracy, at the conscious manipulation of others’ identities and interests, 
as it hints also at human agency- influenced, but not determined, in its role 
as co-conspirator”59.
How successful the strategy has been employed, however, cannot be fully 
answered without looking closer at the Nationalist and Unionist identities and 
their responses to the  peace process.
3.2 A Real Change of Identity in Northern Ireland?
The two divided communities in Northern Ireland respond to the  peace 
process. At first glance, the strategy employed by the Irish, British and US 
governments appears to be fruitful: the renouncement of violence, especially by 
the IRA and all-party negotiations that actually led to an agreement supported 
by the majority of the people of Northern Ireland are only some evidence for 
it. 
The traditional aim of Nationalism is the establishment of a united Ireland, 
be it through peaceful means like the SDLP or through the armed struggle 
that the IRA had employed. The Irish constitution had always supported this 
aim of unity in the articles 2 and 3 of the constitution claiming territorial 
jurisdiction over the island as a whole. In the referendum about the Good 
Friday Agreement Nationalists gave up maybe not their aim but certainly 
the ideological claim for a united Ireland and exchanged it for the political 
principle of consent, recognising the rights of Unionists to be in Ireland for the 
first time. Earlier through the ceasefires of 1994 and 1997 the IRA had already 
shown its willingness to do so by renouncing violence. To say that this came 
about through the “acknowledgement by Republicans that their long war of 
attrition against Unionists and the British state had been a failure”60 is naïve. 
Rather it has to be seen as a product of negotiations and persuasions and a 
re-defining of interests. 
The New Ireland Forum redefining Nationalism towards Unionism and 
the Anglo-Irish Agreement has proved to Nationalist hardliners in Northern 
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Ireland that the Irish government was willing to accept partition in favour of 
the principle of consent.61 This apparent lack of support, surely contributed 
to Sinn Fein’s redefinition of its goal. But also the Anglo-Irish Agreement 
empowered Irish influence over Northern Ireland which certainly was perceived 
as positive. Intense negotiations between John Hume and Gerry Adams and 
later between Sinn Fein and the British government provided the soil for the 
IRA ceasefire. The possibility for political participation offered by the British 
government through the Downing Street Declaration can be described as the 
carrot pulling Sinn Fein into all-party negotiations finally exchanging their 
territorial claim against political power. 
The matter is more complicated with Unionism. One should not make 
the mistake to perceive Unionism as a closed unit; Unionism has always been 
divided into different sub-groups, as the huge variety of Unionist political 
parties indicates. Indeed, Morrow states that “Unionism is a movement whose 
unity consists largely in its common rejection of all things Nationalist.”62 This 
is a very wide definition of Unionism leaving room for the numerous varieties 
within Unionism. Still, the  peace process shows significant differences in the 
rejection of Nationalism and the term ’all things’ might be a little too far 
fetched. It is true, however, that for a long time common Unionist political 
strategy was to oppose any attempts to engage in power-sharing with the 
Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland.63 This strategy had been employed 
fairly successfully with the most prominent example simply but very effectively 
striking to death the power-sharing executive set up by the Sunningdale 
Agreement in 1974. 
When in 1985 the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed, it came as a shock 
for the Unionist community. They had not expected such a move from the 
Conservative Thatcher government in the first place and consequently felt 
betrayed. With the establishment of the intergovernmental conference, Dublin 
was given power over Northern Ireland which was seen as a strong threat to 
the Union. Although the Agreement was still based on the principle of consent, 
Unionists felt sold out, especially since they felt that they had been given no 
chance to politically influence the Agreement. Strong opposition to the Anglo-
Irish Agreement was the consequence and therefore, Unionists made attempts 
to deal with it as usual. But things were different this time. Although Unionists 
tried to bring the Agreement to an end by non co-operation they did little 
harm to it and in 1989 the two governments even renewed their commitment 
to it. Economic factors may also be a reason of the lack of success of the 
boycott of the Agreement: the Northern Irish economy was very weak at that 
time and strikes therefore did not have the same impact as a decade earlier.64 
Unionists soon realised that political abstinence did not have the wished-for 
success and the fear of further exclusion from decision making as exercised in 
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the Anglo-Irish Agreement made them finally engage in talks with the British 
government and other Northern Irish parties.65 Economic factors played a 
stronger role in convincing Unionists to go along than it had for Nationalists. 
The fear of a united Ireland was certainly not only a result of anti-Catholicism 
but also strengthened by the fact, that Ireland was one of the poorest countries 
of the European union. But it is naïve to expect that these attempts were not 
recognised by Unionists. The reactions to it within Unionism are divided. On 
the one side there is the strongly religious Unionism very much influenced by 
Paisley’s warning against such attempts of bribery and especially US American 
involvement considered as international conspiracy led by the Vatican.66 There 
is no doubt that something like a conspiracy was at work although not directed 
by the Vatican. Anti-Catholicism is not easy to overcome in Northern Ireland 
and even today many Unionists are strongly influenced by it.67 
One the other side there is a recognition of the inevitability of change and 
the attempts to make the best out of it: “Economic co-operation, we trust, is 
no longer advanced as a strategy for creeping unification, After the Agreement 
there is no longer any need to engage in such tactical manoeuvres and a 
growth in co-operation is consequently possible”68. Though David Trimble 
certainly realised that the Agreement did not stop the strategy of economic 
co-operation, it acknowledges the advantages of economic improvement and 
tries to orientate itself along these lines.
Unionism consequently still involves an element of fear of a Roman 
Catholic Ireland trying to invade Northern Ireland. But on the other hand, 
they have realised that a transformation in the South has taken place which 
diminishes the power of the church and see co-operation therefore as less 
threatening. Besides, the economic development of Ireland into the “Celtic 
Tiger” certainly helped a new perception of Ireland on its way. 
The changes within Northern Irish society are not easy to grasp. It seems 
that a constant combination of pushing and pulling of the conflicting parties- 
a strategy of the carrot and the stick- made participation in the  peace process 
easier. Still, the  peace process is not finished yet and the realisation of the 
Good Friday Agreement has in some aspects proven to be very difficult as the 
on-going problem about the decommissioning of the IRA suggests.
The avoidance of new elections in Northern Ireland by the British 
government shows that they are well aware of the fragility of the  peace process. 
Also, though paramilitary violence is decreasing, sectarianism is still very alive 
and well as the example of the Holy Cross primary school issue shows.
It seems that manipulation of interests can be employed as a support for 
a  peace process but that also the participants must show some willingness 
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to change. There is always the possibility that some identities willingly resist 
manipulation of their interests as is the case with some Unionists. Here the 
cognitive element comes into play. McSweeney describes it best when he 
states:
Both parties to the Northern Ireland conflict are being seduced into a new set 
of practices and a new habit of  identity, in the sense that both must weigh the 
advantages and perils of a reconstructed narrative, compatible with new interests, 
against the old one – which was no less a product of elite management of material 
and cultural factors than the one on offer today.69
4. The Relevance for Indonesia
I contend that a broader understanding of  identity should also create 
moderate solutions towards several  peace processes in Indonesia. Just to 
mention one among many, East Timorese refugees in Indonesian border are 
victims of so called International political change. The rise of the Communist 
Party in East Timor frightened the US Administrations during the Cold War. 
Using the International Military Education and Training (IMET) Program, US 
forced Indonesian Military Government to annex East Timor. But soon after the 
Cold War era, the downfall of the Soviet Union brought change in International 
politics as well as US policy. US Administration under Clinton strongly 
criticized the role of the Indonesian army in relation to human rights abuses 
in East Timor. It affected International economic support for Indonesia which 
required human right implementation in East Timor. We noted that Indonesia 
was not US privilege any more. With International pressure on Indonesia, East 
Timor got its independence finally. But thousands of them as refuges are still 
in the border of West Timor. Seems that they do not want to return to their 
homeland, but on the other hands their reception from Indonesian side is a 
half hearted policy. Living in the refugee camp for such a long time can trigger 
potential riot in the future. 
As the Northern Ireland case shows what we regard as Indonesia not 
only depends on domestic understanding but also on International recognition 
and political changes. Several other cases in Indonesia such as the Papuan 
Independent Movement or Acehnese Movement, conflicts in Moluccas and Poso 
reveal to us that what we regard as Indonesia is still a long way to perceive 
and lots of study should be done.
5. Conclusion
As the example of Northern Ireland has shown, the role of  identity in 
international relations is a complex issue. Firstly, it seems that internal conflicts 
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are not left to be resolved by the state alone any more, as the Realists would 
claim. The involvement of the US government in the conflict transcends this 
 Realist concept and gives an internal conflict international attention. Secondly, it 
has to be taken into account that state identities are not purely an international 
matter as Waltz and Wendt suggest. Neither are state identities determined by 
the international self-help system, nor are they purely formed by international 
interaction forming the concept of self and other. State  identity is not only 
driven by international structures, but also involves domestic factors. The US 
get involved in the Northern Irish conflict, because it also followed domestic 
interests like influencing voters or serving their own economy. The same applies 
for the British government; their position in the  peace process was influenced 
by international factors like their relationship to Ireland and the US, but there 
was also a strong domestic influence like the diminishing support for the Union 
in Great Britain and the high costs of maintaining it.
Thirdly, the reasons for the state behaviour shown above are all connected 
to interests, domestic and international. None of the state involvements in 
the  peace process are based on a purely  moral choice. I do not deny that the 
motive to bring  peace and stability to Northern Ireland for its own sake did 
not play a role but it was certainly helped by interests. The  identity of the 
US under Bill Clinton for example appeared to be characterised by a strong 
involvement in  peace keeping and in the facilitating of  peace processes
The concept of  identity in international relations is therefore of some 
importance but has to be seen in a complex relationship of cognitive and 
material, of domestic and international, of state, sub-state and individual 
factors. 
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